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RYAN GOLTEN*

Lobato v. Taylor: How the Villages of the
Rio Culebra, the Colorado Supreme
Court, and the Restatement of Servitudes
Bailed Out the Treaty of Guadalupe

Hidalgo
ABSTRACT
In 2002, the Colorado Supreme Court ended one of the state's
longest legal battles by announcing that the descendants of
individuals who settled the Sangre de Cristo Land Grant in
southern Colorado have the right to use the lands within the
original Grant. In a shocking ruling, Lobato v. Taylor reversed
over 40 years of case law that had rejected local landowners'
claims to these so-called "settlement rights." The claims dated
back to an 1863 document by Charles Beaubien, who received the
Grant from the Mexican government in the mid-1800s and
documented the rights of the initial settlers to use the resources
on the Grant'smountain tract. Lobato held that the successors of
these settlers established implied rights to the mountain tract by
prescription, prior use, and estoppel under the modem
Restatement of Servitudes. In a significant departurefrom past
land grant decisionsfrom the past century, the court interpreted
these common law doctrines broadly in order to honor the original
intent of the parties and serve the interests of justice. This
equitable approach allowed the court to consider evidence of the
settlers' original expectations, subsequent use of the land, and
Mexican legal and cultural norms of the time to interpret the
rights established at common law. Lobato provides important
tools for vindicating historic rights that trace back to our
antecedent sovereigns, and for using the laws and practices of
previous regimes to inform these rights under the American
common law.
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University of Michigan. Co-Editor-in-Chief, Natural Resources Journal, 2003-2004. I deeply
appreciate the help and expertise of Jeff Goldstein, Malcolm Ebright, Em Hall, Francisco
Martinez, Justin Miller, Brandt Milstein, Maria Mondragon-Valdez, Arnie Valdez, Julie
Waggener, and Heather Wight-Axling in helping me prepare, research, and edit this article.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Of the countless conflicts over land in the American Southwest,
perhaps none are as historically complex, legally controversial, or
socially devastating as those involving the loss of lands from the original
land grants under Mexico and Spain. For 500 years, the land and its
inhabitants have transitioned through the governance of three
sovereigns with widely varying legal regimes. Claims to property rights
that arose under the legal regimes of Spain or Mexico, however, are
routinely rejected by American courts. Some scholars and advocates
argue that common law courts are simply unequipped to recognize the
fundamentally distinct property interests that originated under our
antecedent sovereigns.1
Recently the U.S. Supreme Court let stand an astounding 2002
decision by the Colorado Supreme Court that announced a new
2
approach to interpreting centuries-old land grant claims. Bringing to a
close one of the oldest and most well-known lawsuits in Colorado
history, Lobato v. Taylor announced that landowners in the San Luis
Valley have rights to graze livestock, collect firewood, and harvest
timber on land grant property that they and their predecessors have
used for 150 years. 3 In recognizing these rights at common law, the court
considered evidence of Mexican law and custom to interpret the intent
and expectations of the original nineteenth century settlers of the Grant,
evidence that American courts had previously refused to consider,
finding it irrelevant to rights created under the American common law.
By acknowledging the legal relevance of Mexican property law
and cultural norms to resolving contemporary land claims, the Lobato
decision signals a new turn in land grant law. For over a century,
American courts have rejected land grant claims by refusing to recognize
Mexican or Spanish law as a source of property rights and by narrowly
construing common law property doctrines. While Lobato left unresolved
the relevance of Mexican law and treaty agreements to land grant claims,
the decision nonetheless offers a new approach to construing these
claims under the implied and equitable doctrines of the common law.
Instead of emphasizing the mechanistic doctrines that have long stymied
courts and land grant advocates, Lobato turned to the deeply rooted,
American common law principles of honoring parties' intent and
expectations, using Mexican law and custom as relevant historical
1. See, e.g., MARIA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT
AND THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST 1840-1900, at 173-82, 214-16 (2002).
2. Taylor v. Lobato, 540 U.S. 1073 (2003) (denying certiorari).
3. Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 956 (Colo. 2002).
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evidence. By reconciling nineteenth century Mexican understandings of
land use with the requirements of Anglo-American property law, Lobato
offers courts a model for recognizing some of the oldest and most
important property rights in the American Southwest.
A. The Context
Much of the tension between the U.S. and the Mexican and
Spanish legal systems traces back to the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, in which Mexico ceded to the United States the territory of New
Mexico, which included present-day southern Colorado. 4 The United
States, in turn, guaranteed that existing property rights in the ceded
territory would be "inviolably respected." 5 However, to give legal effect
to claims that originated before 1848, American courts are frequently
asked to interpret Spanish and Mexican legal concepts and documents,
neither of which tend to satisfy the common law's emphasis on magic
language and unencumbered, fee simple title. 6 Most American courts
lack the willingness, imagination, and perhaps even the legal tools
necessary to translate these pre-Treaty land claims, along with concepts
of shared property rights and common control over resources, into the
language and principles of the common law. 7
The Lobato case presented the problem of interpreting land
claims that evolved as the United States gained sovereignty over former
Mexican territory. In the mid-1800s, the predecessors of the Lobato
plaintiffs left their communities in northern New Mexico to settle the
Sangre de Cristo Land Grant in the San Luis Valley of what is now

4. Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of Mexico,
Feb. 2, 1848, U.S.-Mex., 9 Stat. 922 [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgol.
5. See Lobato, 71 P.3d at 946. The words "inviolably respected" replaced language
from a draft article 10, which guaranteed that all land grants would be presumed valid
under American law to the same extent as they had been under Mexican law. The deletion
of article 10 resulted in an ambiguous standard that was inconsistently interpreted by
American courts, generally to the detriment of the land grantees and their heirs. MALCOLM
EBRIGHT, LAND GRANTS AND LAWsuITs IN NORTHERN NEW MExIcO 28-29 (1994). For a more

thorough discussion of the Treaty history and language, see id. at 28-37 (arguing that, in
negotiating the Treaty, the goal of the United States was to gain additional territory
without being beholden to Mexican property claims, and that, rather than being fairly
"negotiated," the Treaty and related provisions were imposed on Mexico by the United
States).
6. See MONTOYA, supra note 1,at 175-82.
7. See, e.g., Martinez v. Rivera, 196 F.2d 192 (10th Cir. 1952); Flores v. Bruesselbach,
149 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1945); Payne Land & Livestock Co. v. Archuleta, 180 F. Supp. 651
(D.N.M. 1960); Martinez v. W.H. Mundy, 295 P.2d 209 (N.M. 1956); H.N.D. Land Co. v.
Suazo, 105 P.2d 744 (N.M. 1940).
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south-central Colorado.8 They did so at the urging of French-Canadian
Charles Beaubien, who in the mid-1840s acquired the one million-acre
Land Grant from the Mexican government, under the condition that he
9
would settle it with a permanent agricultural community. To encourage
settlement, Beaubien promised the settlers they would receive sufficient
8. Eric L. Peters & Marianne L. Stoller, The Tameling Decision 3-4 (1981)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). The original Grant comprised all of the land
in present-day Costilla County. See Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1159 (Colo. 2003).
9. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 943. Governor Manuel Armijo originally granted the Sangre de
Cristo to Narciso Beaubien, Charles' 13-year-old son, and Stephen Luis Lee, an Americannot a Mexican citizen-as part of the Mexican government's effort to fortify its northern
frontier against the encroaching United States. See MoNTOYA, supra note 1, at 211-12.
Charles Beaubien gained ownership of the Grant after his son and Lee were killed in the
infamous Taos Uprising of 1847, at which point Beaubien inherited his son's portion and
purchased Lee's interest. See id. Beaubien and Lee's petition, filed two days after Christmas
1843, had emphasized that the land was ideal for farming and ranching, and illustrates that
the purpose of the Grant was to settle the land with a permanent agricultural community:
Louis Lee, a naturalized citizen and resident of the first demarcation of
Taos, and Narciso Beaubien, a citizen, and also a resident of the abovenamed place, appear before your Excellency in the manner and form best
provided by law and most convenient to us, and state that, desiring to
encourage the agriculture of the country, and place it in a flourishing condition,
and being restricted with lands wherewith to accomplish said purpose, we have
seen and examined with great care that embraced within the Costilla,
Culebra, and Trincheras Rivers, including the Rito of the Indians and the
Sangre de Cristo to its junction with the Del Norte River, and finding in it
the qualities offruitfulness,fertile lands for cultivation, and abundance of pasture
and water, and all that is requiredfor its settlement, and the raisingof horned and
woollen cattle, and being satisfied with it, and knowing that it is public
land, we have not hesitated to apply to your Excellency, praying you, as
an act of justice, to grant to us the possession of a tract of land to each one
within the afore-mentioned boundaries, promising to commence the
settlement of the same within the time prescribed by law, until the colony shall be
established and permanentlyfixed, provided your Excellency be pleased to grantit
to us. Such is the offer we make, and swear it is not done in malice.
See Tameling v. U.S. Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 647 (1876) (emphasis added).
For a detailed account of the petition and the issuance and confirmation of the Grant,
see J.J. Bowden, Private Land Claims in the Southwest (1969) (unpublished partial J.D.
thesis, Southern Methodist University) (on file with author). The Ute Indians inhabiting the
San Luis Valley at the time drove back initial efforts by the Mexican settlers to colonize the
Grant. See id. at 886. However, by 1870, there were almost 3000 former Mexican citizens
living on the southern part of the Sangre de Cristo grant. Peters & Stoller, supranote 8, at 5.
Upon relocating to the Sangre de Cristo grant, the settlers received narrow strips of land
along a stream, or vara strips, for individual farming and were allowed access to the
mountain tract for grazing and additional resources. For an in-depth discussion of the
process for issuing land grants under Mexican and Spanish law and custom, see EBRIGHT,
supra note 5, at 21-28. For a discussion of the meaning of vara strips, see Marianne L.
Stoller, Report on the History and Claims for Usufruct Rights by the Residents of the
Culebra River Villages on Portions of the Sangre de Cristo Land Grant 14-15 (1997)
(submitted to the district court and on file with Dr. Stoller); Lobato, 71 P.3d at 943.
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land for home sites, cultivation, grazing, and other subsistence purposes,
in keeping with Mexican and Spanish custom.10 Over 100 families
moved to the remote land grant at the foot of the towering Sangre de
Cristo Mountains on the precarious northern frontier of Mexico. From
this point on, these families and their successors depended on the nearby
mountain tract, known as La Sierra, or later as the Taylor Ranch, for
grazing, firewood, hunting, fishing, and timber."
In 1863, Charles Beaubien fulfilled his commitment to the
original settlers by executing and recording a document (Beaubien
document) that described the settlers' rights to access shared resources
on the Grant-a document that would later prove pivotal in the Lobato
litigation. 1 2 The Beaubien document contained provisions for various
aspects of life and development on the Grant, including the use and care
of the water, regulation of roads, land for churches, location of mills, and
pasturing of animals. 13 In a clause that, according to the court in Lobato,

10. Stoller, supra note 9, at 5, 9-11. See also Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Colo.
1994) (citing Charles Beaubien's 1863 document).
11. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 955 (citing Dr. Marianne Stoller's report offered at trial).
12. Id. at 943. One of the many translations of the document is reproduced in Rael, 876
P.2d at 1213:
Town of San Luis of the Culebra, May 11, 1863 Book 1, Page 256
It has been decided that the Rito Seco lands shall remain uncultivated
for the use of the residents of San Luis, San Pablo and the Vallejos, and
other inhabitants of said towns, for pastures and community grounds, etc.
And that the Rito Seco waters are hereby distributed among the said
inhabitants of the town of San Luis, and those on the other side of the
Vega, whose lands lie in the vicinity and cannot be irrigated by the water
of the Rio Culebra. After measuring off three acres in front of the Church,
which are hereby donated to it, the Vega shall be for the use of the
inhabitants of this town and of the others up [unintelligible] the Vallejos
Creek and also for the benefit of those who may in the future, settle on the
Gregorio Martin Creek (San Francisco) from the road down to the
narrows. It is understood that the lots shall run East and West, 50 varas,
and never North and South and no one shall have a right as they might
have thought, to place any obstacles or hindrances to interfere with the
rights of others. The regulations as to roads shall be also observed so as to
allow every one to have access to his farm lands. Also, in using the water,
care shall be taken not to cause damage to any one.
All the inhabitants shall have the use of pasture, wood, water, and
timber and the mills that have been erected shall remain where they are,
not interfering with the rights of others. No stock shall be allowed in said
lands, except for household purposes. All those who come as settlers shall
agree to abide by the rules and regulations and shall help, as good citizens
and be provided with the necessary weapons for the defense of the
settlement.
TWO WITNESSES (Signed) Carlos Beaubien
13. Stoller, supra note 9, at 15-16.
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pertained to La Sierra, the document guaranteed that "all the inhabitants
and timber,
will have enjoyment of benefits of pastures, water, firewood
14
always taking care that one does not injure another."
After his death the following year, Beaubien's heirs sold the
15
Grant to William Gilpin, the first territorial governor of Colorado.
Pursuant to an agreement that Beaubien had made with Gilpin before his
death, Gilpin affirmed his promise to honor the rights of the local
and preserved in
farmers to La Sierra.16 These rights have been restated
17
tract.
mountain
this
involving
deed
every subsequent
The settlers' descendants and successors consistently used the
resources on La Sierra for over one hundred years. In 1960, a North
Carolina lumberman named Jack Taylor purchased one of the original
Grant's few remaining large parcels, a 77,524-acre mountain tract above
San Luis, Colorado, that comprised La Sierra.18 A New Yorker article at the
time described a "cloud" on the title to Taylor's property, stating that
"[tihe cloud turned out to be the virtually universal belief in Costilla
County that the descendants of the Sangre de Cristo Grant settlers had
the legal and moral right to pasture cattle and gather wood and cut
timber and hunt game on the Mountain Tract, no matter who owned
it."19 Given these claims to the mountain, the land was cheap despite its
rich resources. 20 With plans to log the mountain, Taylor soon fenced the

14. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 946-48.
15. See Stoller, supra note 9, at 17-18.
16. Rael, 875 P.2d at 1213-14. The conveyance also required Gilpin to convey the vara
deeds to the remaining settlers. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 943. Beaubien apparently chose to sell the
Grant to Gilpin due to his onerous back taxes, as he also owned a half interest in the
neighboring Maxwell Land Grant. See Peters & Stoller, supra note 8, at 4; Montoya, supra
note 1, at 212.
17. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 953.
18. Id. at 943. Like each one preceding it, Taylor's deed included the clause that his
ownership was subject to the "claims of the local people by prescription or otherwise to
right to pasture, wood, and lumber and so-called settlement rights in, to, and upon said
land." Id. In 1973 Taylor purchased another 2500 acres adjoining his property, known as the
"Salazar estate," where previous owners had filed a successful Torrens action to register
the property in fee simple. Id. at 944. Together, Taylor's property comprises what is known
as the "Taylor Ranch," or La Sierra, and is jointly the subject of the Lobato litigation. Id.
19. Calvin Trillin, U.S. Journal: Costilla County, Colorado; A Little Cloud on the Title, 52
NEW YORKER 122 (1976).
20. Taylor bought the land for what seemed like a bargain price of five hundred
thousand dollars. Id. See Jeffrey A. Goldstein, Panel Presentation: Lobato v. Taylor, 5
SCHOLAR 183, 186-87 (2002-2003). In addition to 14,000 foot Culebra Peak, the property
included flowing streams and lush riparian areas, forested mountain slopes, and an array
of wildlife including deer, elk, bear, and a population of endangered Rocky Mountain Cut
Throat Trout. See id. at 186; Stoller, supranote 9, at 21-24.
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property and did everything he could to keep out the local community
and prevent their use of the land and its resources. 21
B. The Lawsuit and the Lobato Decision
In 1981, the descendants and successors of the original land
grant settlers brought an action against Taylor to recognize their historic
claims to "usufructuary" or "settlement" rights, including the rights to
harvest timber and firewood, graze, hunt, fish, and recreate on La Sierra,
regardless of its private ownership. 22 The plaintiffs claimed they were
guaranteed usufructuary rights to La Sierra under Mexican law, which
the United States had promised to honor in the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, and under the American common law, by either grant or
prescription. 23
For decades courts refused to recognize the plaintiffs' claims. 24
Then, in a striking reversal of the lower court decisions, the Colorado
Supreme Court in Lobato defined in clear common law terms the
settlement rights that Beaubien had created under American law but that
were based on Mexican notions of land use and property rights. The
court analyzed these property rights as easements, and more generally as
servitudes, under the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes (Restatement of Servitudes), considering evidence of Mexican law and culture to
inform these common law rights. 25 In a stunning slap in the face of the
lower courts, the Lobato court stated:
We are attempting to construe a 150 year-old document
written in Spanish by a French Canadian who obtained a
21. By this time, the community had already organized the Asociaci6n de Derechos
Civicos to protest the sale and Taylor's exclusive use of the land. See Trillin, supra note 19, at
122. Violence broke out repeatedly when Taylor used force to keep local residents off the
property. See id. at 125-28. Once the title to his property was cleared, Taylor began to clearcut La Sierra, inspiring widespread resistance and outrage that continue to this day. See
Olivia Martinez & Rachel Gonzales, From Taylor to Pai: The HistoricalStrugglefor La Sierra, in
THE STRUGGLE FOR LA SIERRA: A BEYOND CHIcANISMO EXPERIENCE 10, 12 (2003) [hereinafter
BEYOND CHICANISMO].

22. Rael v. Taylor, 832 P.2d 1011 (Colo. App. 1991). A "usufructuary" right is the right
to use and enjoy another's property without damaging or diminishing the property.
BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 651 (West 1996).

23. Rael v. Taylor, 832 P.2d at 1013.
24. See Rael v. Taylor, 832 P.2d at 1014; Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210, 1228 (Colo. 1994);
Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821 (Colo. App. 2000).
25. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 945. A "servitude" is a burden on one person's land that gives
certain rights to another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 573 (West 1996). An "express
easement" is a type of servitude that a landowner voluntarily places on his/her property
that is intended to bind future owners of that property. Id. at 215.
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conditional grant to an enormous land area under Mexican
law and perfected it under American law. Beaubien wrote
this document when he was near the end of his
adventurous life in an apparent attempt to memorialize
commitments he had made to induce families to move
hundreds of miles to make homes in the wilderness. It
would be the height of arrogance and nothing but a legal
fiction for us to claim that we can interpret this document
26
without putting it in its historical context.
In both its tone and legal analysis, the court departed from a long line of
decisions that had refused to consider legal rights with roots in Mexico
and increasingly archaic
and Spain, and that had relied on a technical
27
reading of property rights at common law.

26. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 947.
27. For a detailed explanation of the dismantling of land grants under U.S. law, see
generally EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 45-54. Among the legal obstacles facing land grant
advocates and heirs, the most common have been (1) the Tameling decision, see discussion
infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (precluding claimants from looking behind a
congressional confirmation of a land grant to rights that may have preexisted it under
Mexican and Spanish law); (2) the misconfirmation of land grants due to mistake and
fraud, see discussion infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text; (3) the Sandoval decision, see
discussion infra note 49 and accompanying text (holding that that the common lands of
community land grants were held by the governments of Mexico and Spain and passed to
the United States as public domain lands); (4) the fact that once community land grants
were confirmed as private grants, speculators and lawyers were able to acquire interests
and force partition suits; (5) lands long believed to be commonly held, which were used by
a community for hundreds of years, often failed to satisfy the requirements of adversity
and exclusivity necessary to prove adverse possession or prescriptive use under the
common law, see infra notes 28-30; (6) rights by grant or dedication required magic words
and documentation at common law that had often not survived the settlement process. See
infra notes 28-30.
Many of these later legal problems stemmed from the heavy legal burdens and
practical obstacles that faced land grantees and settlers in the mid to late 1800s, when the
United States began to confirm and adjudicate land holdings under the Surveyor General
and later the Court of Private Land Claims. See infra text accompanying note 36. Under the
grossly under-funded and under-resourced Surveyor General, land grant heirs and settlers
were required to defend their property rights, without proper notice or other due process
guarantees, on a first-come, first-served process in which many were defrauded and
manipulated by American lawyers. See EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 45-54. Later, under the
much less lenient Court of Private Land Claims, the burden of proof was squarely placed
on land grant claimants to defend their asserted rights against skilled and highly resourced
government lawyers in adversarial proceedings. Not surprisingly, many land grant heirs
lost their land rights through this process. See also N.M. Land Grant F. & Mexicano Land
Educ. & Conservation Tr., The GeneralAccounting Office Report PreliminaryComments, at http
://www.southwestbooks.org/gaolgfresponse.htm (last visited June 22, 2005) (discussing
the ways in which New Mexico land grants were incorrectly confirmed, and ultimately
partitioned and sold in many cases, in ways that the 2004 Report by the General
Accounting Office failed to recognize). See GOV'T AccOUNTING OFF. (GAO), TREATY OF
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The Lobato court charted new territory in two important respects.
First, the court used Mexican and Spanish law, custom, and historical
use not as a source of legal rights but to elucidate the intent and
expectations of the original parties and settlers of the Grant. The court
also demonstrated the capacity of the common law, led by the recently
simplified Restatement of Servitudes, to recognize concepts of common
use, even of privately owned land, despite the lack of express language
in the Beaubien document typically required by American courts. 28 The
court's emphasis on equitable concepts of fairness, justifiable
expectations, and original intent is a shift from American courts' narrow
reading of the common law and suggests an emerging significance of the
modern Restatement of Servitudes in vindicating land grant rights.
The Lobato court's ability to translate Mexican property interests
into the common law offers hope for heirs of land grantees and settlers
with similar land claims in Colorado and New Mexico, many of whom
have lost property rights during more than a century of land grabs and
legal maneuvers. The history of the Sangre de Cristo Grant, an analysis
of the Lobato court's reasoning, and a review of easement and land grant
cases in Colorado and New Mexico suggests that the Lobato case may
bear importantly on other land grant litigation in the Southwest. This is
particularly true of the court's use of evidence of historic practice, as well
as law and custom, to fill in gaps from missing or ambiguous deeds and
other documents. In these ways and undoubtedly others, the decision
offers important tools and guidance for courts, advocates, and land grant
litigants.
II. WHAT HAPPENED BELOW AND THE PROBLEMS OF
PRECEDENT: 1960-2000
The first phase of litigation over the Taylor Ranch began in 1960.
In the century between Charles Beaubien's death in 1864 and this time,
GUADALUPE HIDALGO: FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING
COMMUNITY LAND GRANT CLAIMS IN NEW MExIcO, available at www.gao.gov/new.

items/d0459.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2005), for the entire 2004 report by the GAO
discussing the federal government's role in confirming New Mexico's community land
grants following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
28. This decision defies the claims of some scholars, who conclude that the complex
and interwoven property concepts of Mexico and Spain are simply irreconcilable with the
common law. Compare MONTOYA, supra note 1, with EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 266-67
(explaining that the common law was in fact familiar with such patterns, as land tenure in
medieval England frequently involved common and overlapping land holdings). See also
Richard D. Garcia & Todd Howland, Determining the Legitimacy of Spanish Land Grants in
Colorado: Conflicting Values, Legal Pluralism, and Demystification of the Sangre de Cristo/Rael
Case, 16 CHicANO-LATINo L. REV. 39, 61-63 (1995).
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William Gilpin and his successors in interest had subdivided and sold off
most of the original land grant. 29 During this time, pursuant to their
understanding of their settlement rights, the original settlers and their
successors used the resources on La Sierra without protest from the
private landowners. In 1960, however, Taylor fenced the mountain and
began his battle against the local community. 3°
A. The Torrens Action
Within months of purchasing La Sierra, Taylor filed a Torrens
title claim in U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado to register his
title in fee simple and extinguish any claims of the local community. 31 In
defense of their usufructuary rights, the named defendants raised
essentially the same arguments that they would assert for the next 40
years. They claimed that they were entitled to use the land based either
on the terms of the Grant itself, the language of the Beaubien document,
or the doctrine of prescription as a result of their historic use of La
Sierra.32 Specifically, the defendants argued that their predecessors had
received the right to use the resources on La Sierra from the Mexican
government in 1844, and the United States was bound by Treaty to
respect these rights. 33 Further, apart from their rights under Mexican
law, they argued that Beaubien explicitly granted their predecessors
29. Immediately upon his acquisition of the Grant, Gilpin began to parcel up the land
in order to sell to British, Dutch, and American investors for speculation and development.
See Peters & Stoller, supra note 8, at 4. See also MONTOYA, supra note 1, at 9, 114-20
(describing the similar process of land speculation in the neighboring Maxwell Grant). In
the late 1870s, the Trinchera Estates Company purchased the northern portion of the Grant;
the southern half became the Costilla Estates. See Peters & Stoller, supra note 8, at 4. The
southern half was later sold to the United States Freehold Land and Emigration Company
and ultimately became the Taylor Ranch. Id. at 6.
30. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 943, 954-56. In addition to barricading the roads and fencing the
land with barbed wire, Taylor treated the local community with blatant racism and
frequent violence. See, e.g., Trillin, supra note 19, at 128 ("That's what the anti-Anglo thing
is, it's an inferiority complex. They know they're not equal, mentally or physically, to a
white man and that's why they stick together so."). Taylor was notorious for his brutal
treatment of those he found on the property. See Martinez & Gonzales, supra note 21, at 1213.
31. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 943 (citing Taylor v. Jaquez, No. 6904 (D. Colo. Oct. 5, 1965). The
Torrens title registration system, begun in Australia in the mid-nineteenth century, was
designed to clear out overlapping claims to paper titles by settling all adverse claims in one
proceeding. See MONTOYA, supra note 1, at 213; Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210, 1219 (Colo.
1994). By invoking diversity jurisdiction as an out-of-state citizen, Taylor was able to
litigate his Torrens claim in Denver, 240 miles from his opponents. Sanchez v. Taylor, 377
F.2d 733, 736 (10th Cir. 1967).
32. Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 734-35.

33.

Id.
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settlement rights under American law in 1863- rights that were
reiterated in all subsequent deeds to the Taylor Ranch. Even if the
conveyance did not specifically satisfy the strict requirements of the
American law of servitudes, the defendants claimed that their
predecessors' consistent, uninterrupted use of La Sierra for over 100 years
34
granted them enforceable legal rights to La Sierra.
The federal court rejected these arguments based on reasoning
that had long preceded and would long haunt the defendants until the
Lobato decision in 2002.35 The court rejected the defendants' Mexican law
and Treaty claims based on a long line of cases holding that, when
Congress confirmed Beaubien's title to the Sangre de Cristo Grant in
1860, any judicial review of the terms of the Mexican Grant was
foreclosed. 36 In other words, the court would not look behind the patent
to examine the history of the Sangre de Cristo Grant. Even if the
plaintiffs' predecessors were granted usufructuary rights to La Sierra
under Mexican law, any such rights were not reviewable and not
enforceable by courts after Congress confirmed the land and issued a
37
patent to Beaubien.

34. Id.
35. Taylor v. Jaquez, No. 6904 (D.Colo. Oct. 5, 1965), affd, Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 734-35.
36. Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 737 (citing Tameling v. U.S. Freehold & Emigration Co., 93 U.S.
644 (1876)). The Act was pursuant to the system for confirming Spanish and Mexican land
claims in the newly acquired territory. In 1855, Beaubien had petitioned Surveyor General
William Pelham to confirm the Sangre de Cristo Grant at 1,038,195.55 acres, and after
Pelham's favorable recommendation, Congress confirmed Beaubien's ownership of the
entire Grant as recommended by Pelham. See BOWDEN, supra note 9, at 887. For a
discussion of the confirmation process for land grants in Colorado and New Mexico, see
Stoller, supranote 10, at 6-8; MALCOLM EBRIGHT, THE TIERRA AMARILLA GRANT: A HIS7ORY
OF CHICANERY 1-4 (Center for Land Grant Studies Press, 1993) (criticizing the easily
manipulated confirmation process and distinguishing the implications for large,
"speculative" grants such as the Sangre de Cristo and Maxwell grants from "settlement"
grants such as the Tierra Amarilla grant). See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant
Co., 121 U.S. 325 (1887); Flores v. Brusselbach, 149 F.2d 616, 616-17 (10th Cir. 1945); H.N.D.
v. Suazo, 105 P.2d 744 (N.M. 1940); Martinez v. Mundy, 295 P.2d 209, 214 (N.M. 1956). This
is discussed at greater length infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
37. See Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 737, noting:
We find no error in the trial court's conclusion that appellants, as a matter
of law, have no rights in Taylor's land under Mexican law or the original
grant. Any conflicting rights prior to the confirmatory Act of 1860 which
might have arisen or existed by reason of the original grant from Mexico,
considered in the light of Mexican law and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, were thereby extinguished.
The Lobato plaintiffs later argued that this conclusion ignored the fact that, in
recommending confirmation, Surveyor General Pelham had relied on Beaubien's initial
petition, which, rather than attempting to extinguish the local settlement claims to the
Grant, relied on these claims to prove the Grant's validity, stating:
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The federal court also held that the language of the Beaubien
document was insufficient to confer legal rights to La Sierra because the
document did not specify the precise location for exercising such rights,
nor did it contain the magic language of conveyance, grant, or dedication
for the mountain tract that was required under the common law. 38 The
court rejected the defendants' prescriptive claim by holding that their
common use of the land was neither exclusive nor hostile against both
the true owner and the public in general. 39 As was typical of American
courts, the federal court required that, to prove prescription or adverse
possession, a claimant had to show that use was adverse, open,
notorious, exclusive, and continuous. 4° The federal courts concluded that
the defendants' use was neither "exclusive" nor "hostile" because they
used the land together with the other local residents, believing they had
a right to such access. 41 Accordingly, the district court entered a Final
Decree of Confirmation and Registration, which the Tenth Circuit
42
subsequently affirmed.
For the next 15 years the successors of the original land grant
settlers and their supporters prepared to bring their own court action.43
Claimant is prepared further to prove, if deemed necessary, that since the
said grant came into his possession he has had made extensive settlements
on the same, and that it is becoming under his ownership rapidly populated. The claimant therefore respectfully asks a speedy acknowledgment
of his claim.
Petitioner's Opening Brief on Due Process/Res Judicata 18, available at WL 32350466 (July
15, 2002) [hereinafter Appellants' Opening Brief]; Tameling, 93 U.S. at 659.
38. Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 737-38.
39. Id. at 738.
40. Id.; see, e.g., Martinez, 295 P.2d at 214 (rejecting a similar prescriptive claim after
finding that the local residents used the land sporadically, rather than continuously, and
with the implied permission of the landowner, because they entered the property at places
where fences were down or in disrepair).
41. See Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 738.
42. Id. at 733, 735.
43. This effort took immense amounts of organizing, education, research, fundraising,
and outreach. The community, largely through the efforts of the Land Rights Council
(LRC), an organization with inspiration and roots in the Chicano Movement, and its
legendary founding elders, Apolinar Rael and Juan LaCombe, organized a campaign of
research, fundraising, activism, and legal strategizing. LRC's efforts ranged from extensive
legal and historical research, including compiling local histories, collecting documents, and
going door-to-door to talk with community members, to finding pro bono lawyers and
framing legal strategy, educating the community, and using the media to organize and
generate interest in the Taylor Ranch issue on a local, statewide, and national level. Daniel
Salcido, Historical Discontinuity and a Struggle in Transition, in BEYOND CHICANISMO, supra
note 21, at 26, 27-31 (2003); Martinez & Gonzdles, supra note 21, at 13-14. It also included
endless meetings, lost time with family, constant trips to Denver, and perpetual emotional
strain, as LRC activists who lived in the skirts and shadows of La Sierra experienced the
conflict on a daily level. See Interview with Maria Mondragon-Valdz, author of
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In 1981, one hundred Costilla County landowners filed a class action
lawsuit against Jack Taylor in Colorado state court, alleging usufructuary
rights to the mountain tract dating back at least to 1863. 44 The plaintiffs
first argued that Taylor's Torrens decree was void because he had failed
to give them proper notice of his action. 45 They then asked the court to
find that the 1863 Beaubien document either memorialized or created
rights to collect timber and firewood, graze, hunt, fish, and recreate on La
Sierra.46 This latter claim required the court to determine whether the
Beaubien document expressly granted these rights or, alternatively, if the
document could not satisfy an express grant, whether rights could be
implied because circumstances indicated that Beaubien intended to
convey such rights to the plaintiffs. 47 Finally, the plaintiffs argued that
their rights were created under Mexican law prior to 1848, and that U.S.
courts were bound by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo to honor these
rights. 48
The plaintiffs' theories required the state courts to review
complex historical facts and esoteric common law doctrines, all of which
involved a number of obstacles for the plaintiffs. Among the most
significant was case law that precluded using Mexican or Spanish law as
a source of legal rights in modern land grant claims. 49 If the plaintiffs

TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL LAND GRANT AND THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE
AMERICAN WEST 1840-1900, Oct. 30, 2003 (interview conducted through a series of email
messages).
44. Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210, 1212 (Colo. 1994). Plaintiffs further sought to void a
decree that had quieted title to the Salazar tract and, alternatively, sought damages. Id. at
1217.
45. Rae!, 876 P.2d at 1217-19. Although the title examiner listed all Costilla County
property owners as potential defendants in the Torrens action, Taylor's application only
listed roughly 300 individuals while giving general publication notice to "[aill others
similarly situated who claim certain settlement rights...." Id. at 1214. The Lobato plaintiffs
were not the first in land grant cases to allege such due process violations. For a discussion
of similar problems facing the heirs to the common lands of the Tierra Amarilla land grant,
see EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at xviii.
46. Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821, 828, 831 (Colo. App. 2000).
47. Plaintiffs also claimed damages based on the procedural failures in the Torrens
action. See Rael, 876 P.2d at 1217.
48. Appellants' Opening Brief, supranote 37, at 53-56.
49. See discussion of Tameling, infra notes 51-54. Similarly criticized but even more
devastating for community land grants was the Supreme Court's decision 20 years later in
United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1897), holding that the government held title to
communal lands under Mexican and Spanish law, which then passed to the U.S.
government upon the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo as public lands. The
Sandoval decision has been heavily criticized and has caused many land grant heirs and
communities to lose significant amounts of their land to the United States. See, e.g., Plicido
Gomez, The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of Spanish and Mexican Land Grants,
25 NAT. RESOuRCES J. 1039 (1985); EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 48. For an example of the impact
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pointed to Anglo-American law as the source of their rights, on the other
hand, a number of factors made it difficult for them to prove that their
predecessors received property rights that modem American courts
would recognize. Even if these rights were technically created under
American law, they were done so in nineteenth century Spanish in the
context of a distinct culture, notion of land use, and set of laws and legal
customs. The plaintiffs lacked the clear, written description of their
rights generally demanded by U.S. courts. 50
B. The Problem of Precedent
1. Claims Based on Mexican, Spanish, or Treaty Law
The plaintiffs' theory that their rights were created before 1848
and were enforceable under treaty law has been uniformly rejected in
land grant cases for over 100 years under Tameling v. U.S. Freehold &
Emigration Co. 51 Tameling held that, when Congress confirmed the Sangre
de Cristo and other large Mexican land grants in 1860, the confirmation
functioned as a de novo grant, and, because Congress was acting in its
sovereign capacity, courts could not look behind Congress's judgment. 52
of the Sandoval decision on New Mexico land grants, see Emlen Hall, San Miguel del Bado
and the Loss of the Common Lands of New Mexico Community Land Grants,66 N.M. HIST. REV.
413 (1991).
50. Nonetheless, the documentation in Lobato was fairly significant compared with
other land grant claims, particularly in light of the fact that each subsequent deed to La
Sierrareferred to claims by the local community.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325 (1887); Flores v.
Brusselbach, 149 F.2d 616, 616-17 (10th Cir. 1945); H.N.D. v. Suazo, 105 P.2d 744 (N.M.
1940); Martinez v. Mundy, 295 P.2d 209, 214 (N.M. 1956).
52. Tameling, 93 U.S. 644, 662-63 (1876) (citing Act of June 21, 1860, ch. 167, 12 Stat. 71
(1860)). According to the 1860 Act, its terms "shall only be construed as quitclaims or
relinquishments, on the part of the United States and shall not affect the adverse rights of
any person or persons whosoever." Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 737 (10th Cir. 1967).
Despite this language, courts have consistently held that they are precluded from
determining adverse claims because the issue is a political, not a judicial, consideration. Id.
In Tameling, the U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Company, then owners of the southern
part of the Sangre de Cristo Grant, had filed an ejectment suit against John Tameling, who
had purchased 160 acres allegedly located on the same land. Tameling v. U.S. Freehold
Land and Emigration Co., 2 Colo. 411, 415 (1874). In his defense, Tameling argued that
when it issued the Grant, the Mexican government was limited by the 1824 Mexican
Colonization Law to granting each grantee 11 square leagues, and therefore the two
grantees could only have owned 22 square leagues, or 96,000 acres, rather than the roughly
one million acres shown on the patent. Id. Similarly, he argued that Congress could not
legally have confirmed the Grant for more than what was created under Mexican law,
which the United States was obligated to recognize under the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that, even if Congress had confirmed
more land than the Sangre de Cristo grantees were allowed to receive under Mexican law,

Spring 2005]

LOBATO V. TAYLOR

Courts were therefore precluded from questioning what other rights to
the land may have existed prior to Congress's confirmation. 53 Though
both the holding and reasoning of Tameling continue to be disputed, the
decision has effectively precluded courts from analyzing the pre-1860
54
nature or legal status of land grants that were confirmed by Congress.
Given Tameling's bar to judicial review, the Lobato plaintiffs faced
an uphill battle in raising any objections to Congress's confirmation of
the Grant.5 5 Indeed, this bar had consistently thwarted land grant heirs
who argued that they were deprived of property rights because
Congress wrongly confirmed their lands by mischaracterizing the
nature, size, or other aspect of the original grant.56 In a series of five
this patent should be construed as a de novo grant issued by the United States and thus
inherently valid. Tameling, 93 U.S. 644, 663 (1876). For a detailed description of the case, see
Peters & Stoller, supra note 8, at 2, 13-14 (discussing, inter alia, the possibility of collusion
between John Tameling and the U.S. Freehold & Emigration Company in bringing the suit
in the first place). For a discussion of arguments that Congress's confirmation should
nonetheless not preclude other adverse or concurrent claims to the confirmed land, based
on the standard language of congressional patents, see Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 737; HND v.
Suazo, 105 P.2d at 745.
53. Tameling, 93 U.S. at 663.
54. Id. Tameling was particularly significant as the first case to determine the legal
effect of the 1860 Act of Congress. See Peter & Stoller, supra note 8, at 11-12 (explaining,
inter alia, that, although the short, three-page opinion was based solely on one statute and
a case out of Missouri, it nonetheless became controlling for all subsequent litigation
concerning land grants confirmed by the 1860 Act of Congress); EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at
21-22 (describing the effect of the erroneous Tameling decision on the Tierra Amarilla
Grant, which had been misconstrued by Congress by the 1860 Act as "a case of the blind
leading the blind"); MONTOYA, supra note 1, at 171-87 (criticizing the opinion and
describing its effects on the adjudication of the Maxwell Land Grant); see also Flores, 149
F.2d at 617 (using the rationale of Tameling as its reason for refusing to consider plaintiffs'
claims that the Tierra Amarilla Grant was created as a community grant under Mexican
law and custom).
Congress thereby conclusively confirmed the title to the grant as a private
land grant and its action is final and not subject to judicial review....
[A]ppellants assert a claim of title predicated on the theory that the Grant
was a community grant and that they are the successors to the original
Mexican Community. That contention was foreclosed by the conclusive
effect of the Act of Congress in confirming the Grant as a private land
grant in Francisco Martinez.
Id.
55. See, e.g., Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821, 828 (Colo. App. 2000) (affirming the lower
court's finding that, "by virtue of the Act, confirmation was 'absolute and unconditional' in
Charles Beaubien" under Tameling, and "any purported rights that might [have]
existed.. .were extinguished by the 1860 Confirmatory Act.. .and if the confirmation of title
was contrary to the treaty provisions, the question was political, not judicial").
56. See, e.g., Reilly v. Shipman, 266 F. 852 (8th Cir. 1920); Yeast v. Pru, 292 F. 598
(D.N.M. 1923); Catron v. Laughlin, 11 N.M. 604 (1903) (all three cases holding that courts
are precluded from looking behind Congress's confirmation of land grants to ascertain the
correct identity of the original grantees). For a recent discussion and critique of the ways in
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cases surrounding the Tierra Amarilla Land Grant in northern New
Mexico, for instance, state and federal courts consistently refused to
consider the claims by the local community that Congress had
mistakenly confirmed the Grant as a private grant rather than a
community grant, and that refusal to honor the Grant's legal status
under Mexican law, as required by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
unjustly deprived them of their common ownership of the Grant's
common, unallotted lands. 57 The New Mexico Supreme Court, in the
first of these cases, explained that even if the United States had wrongly
characterized the Tierra Amarilla Grant as a private grant made to
specific individuals, the congressional patent was unreviewable under
59
Tameling.58 The result was no different in Lobato.
2. Claims Based on the Common Law of Servitudes
The same courts that consistently rejected Mexican and treaty
law as a source of rights also had difficulty acknowledging such rights in
which the federal government incorrectly confirmed New Mexico land grants following the
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, see The New Mexico Land Grant Forum and the Mexicano
Land Education and Conservation Trust, supra note 27 (criticizing the government's failure
to recognize and take responsibility for the loss of lands in the confirmation process). For
the official GAO Report on the federal government's role in confirming community land
grants in New Mexico, see GOVT ACCOUNTING OFF., supra note 27.
57. These five cases -two in the New Mexico Supreme Court and three in the federal
courts -are Flores v. Brusselbach, 149 F.2d 616 (10th Cir. 1945); Martinez v. Rivera, 196 F.2d
192 (10th Cir. 1952); Payne Land & Livestock Co. v. Archuleta, 180 F. Supp. 651 (D.N.M.
1960); H.N.D. v. Suazo, 105 P.2d 744 (N.M. 1940); Martinez v. Mundy, 295 P.2d 209 (N.M.
1956). For a thorough explanation of the history of the Tierra Amarilla grant and the
problem presented by Congress's mistaken confirmation of the Grant as a private grant, see
generally EBRIGHT, supranote 36.
58. The court explained that, even if Congress had mischaracterized the nature of the
Grant, under United States v. Sandoval, the title to any preexisting common lands remained
in the Mexican government and passed to the United States in 1848 as public lands. H.N.D.,
105 P.2d at 745-47 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S. 278 (1876)). See discussion
supra note 41. Like the Sangre de Cristo grant, the Tierra Amarilla grant was a large grant
made in 1832 by Governor Armijo during hostilities with the United States. See H.N.D., 105
P.2d at 744-45. Like the Sangre de Cristo and other grants made during the so-called
"Mexican period," the Tierra Amarilla grant was confirmed by the 1860 Act of Congress
after a recommendation by the Surveyor General, and a patent was issued to one
individual, Francisco Martinez. Id. at 745. Land grant heirs argued that, under Mexican law
and custom, the grant was made as a community grant. Id. at 746-47. Accordingly, the
Mexican government retained legal title over such lands with the trust duty to preserve
them for the community, all of which-including the same trust duties-passed to the
United States as specified in the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo. Id. at 747.
59. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 736-37 (10th Cir. 1967) (explaining that,
starting with Tameling, "the Supreme Court has consistently held that the confirmatory Act
of Congress is final and conclusive as to the nature and validity of such a grant and is
therefore not subject to judicial review").
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common law terms. Even if claimants argued that their rights were
created under the American common law, to avoid the problem of using
Mexican law as a source of law, courts struggled to determine the nature
of such rights because Mexican and Spanish documents frequently
lacked the express language required at common law to describe the
intended recipients and to identify the land itself.
As the Lobato litigation would show, the requirement of magic
language particularly impacted land grant claims that relied on
eighteenth and nineteenth century legal documents, many of which
lacked the terms and phrases that American courts required to convey
interests in land. 6° Claimants often argued that ambiguous Spanish
terms should be construed broadly, with reference to their historical
context to illuminate the documents' text. In the Tierra Amarilla cases,
for instance, in addition to making Mexican law and Treaty claims, the
local community argued that Francisco Martinez, a named recipient of
the Grant, conveyed enforceable common law rights to the Grant's
common lands through the numerous deeds, or hijuelas, 61 that he issued
to the Grant's initial settlers between 1861 and 1866.62 Thus, even if the
Tierra Amarilla Grant was private, making it analogous to the Sangre de
Cristo Grant, the hijuelas arguably articulated the rights that Martinez
believed he was obligated to convey under the terms of the original
Grant and controlling Mexican law, much as Beaubien did in his 1863
document. 63 As the lower courts had done in Lobato, the New Mexico
courts rejected the claimants' theory, concluding that the lack of
adequate words of conveyance in the hijuelas, combined with their
ambiguous description of the common lands, prevented them from

60. See EBRIGHT, supra note 5, n.70 and accompanying text (describing the problem of
American courts objecting to Spanish documents as lacking sufficient words to describe
common lands or to convey interests in land, and explaining how these interpretations
were often due to a misunderstanding of the custom and language of the time).
61. Under the laws and practices of Spain, an hijuela was technically a document given
to a party entitled to a share of a deceased person's estate that contained the details of that
person's share. See Martinez, 295 P.2d at 217; Payne Land & Livestock Co., 180 F. Supp. at 654.
See also EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 22 n.62 (explaining that, in the case of the Tierra Amarilla
Grant, the term is used "in the sense of a deed for a share in a land grant, including a tract
of land which was private and conveyance of rights to use the unallotted land which was
owned communally").
62. H.N.D., 105 P.2d at 745, 748. Martinez executed over 100 of these documents to the
original settlers of the Tierra Amarilla Grant, conveying land that was said to "remain with
the right of pastures, woods, water, lumbers, watering places, and roads, common and
free." Id. at 745.
63. Id. Further, the plaintiffs argued, even if the 1860 Act of Congress converted the
grant into a private grant that was unreviewable based on Tameling, the hijuelas essentially
converted the land back into a community grant. EBRIGHT, supranote 5, at 25.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 45

being a valid conveyance under the American common law. 64 The courts
also rejected the claim that even if Mexican and Treaty law could not be
used as a source of rights to the common lands, Mexican law and custom
should nonetheless be used to illuminate Martinez's intent in drafting
the hijuelas.65 These issues were nearly identical to those in Lobato
regarding the Beaubien document's validity as a source of common law
rights.
Two other issues posed significant challenges to the Lobato
plaintiffs. First was the way in which American courts categorized and
compartmentalized different types of servitudes, or rights to another's
land. After centuries of judicial crafting, the common law had come to
require elaborate and distinct elements for each type of servitude. Thus,
prior to the recent Restatement of Servitudes, the technical distinctions
between equitable servitudes, easements, and covenants had resulted in
complex fictions that were developed to fit certain interests into
particular types of servitudes. 66 Such fictions inevitably resulted in a
stilted kind of formalism that precluded considerations of equity and
67
implied rights.
A final hurdle faced by the Lobato plaintiffs was the common
law's requirement of adversity and exclusive use to satisfy a claim of
prescription. These elements were often impossible to meet when
claimants believed they validly held their rights in common. In such
cases, private landowners could successfully argue that because the local
community's access was in common, it was not "exclusive." Similarly, if
the landowner consented to such use, the use could not be sufficiently
"adverse." In the Tierra Amarilla litigation, for instance, courts
repeatedly rejected claims that the hijuelas conveyed use rights under the
law of servitudes because of the claimants' common use of the land. 68
Despite this adverse precedent, the Lobato plaintiffs argued that
the Beaubien document expressly granted their families rights to La
Sierra that burdened Taylor's property as on-going servitudes. 69
64. Martinez, 295 P.2d at 209. See EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 27 n.70 (1993) (describing the
court's failure to consider language typical of deeds under Spanish and Mexican law and
custom).
65. See H.N.D., 105 P.2d at 746, 748; see also Sanchez v. Taylor, 377 F.2d 733, 737 n.3
(10th Cir. 1967).
66. See, e.g., Martinez, 295 P.2d 209; H.N.D., 105 P.2d 744.
67. See discussion infra notes 102-150 and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., Martinez, 295 P.2d at 216-17. The strict requirements of these doctrines had
in many cases become quite arbitrary. For instance, while historically a prescriptive
easement required the element of adversity, lawyers were able to circumvent claims of
adverse use by arguing that in fact, the owner had provided permission to use the property,
thus rendering the rule meaningless as a legal principle.
69. See Sanchez, 377 F.2d at 737-38.
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Alternatively, if the Beaubien document did not satisfy the requirements
of an express grant, they argued that their rights were enforceable as
implied easements to La Sierra,based on their history of open, continuous,
and uninterrupted use of the land. 70 This latter theory ultimately
prevailed, but only after the plaintiffs convinced the Colorado Supreme
Court to focus on the equitable approach to the law of servitudes taken
by the new Restatement and old Colorado easement cases.
C. The Lobato Litigation: What Happened Below
Before the plaintiffs could attack the substantive problems
described above, they had to prove that their claims were not
procedurally barred by the earlier Torrens decision. 71 This alone took the
courts over a decade to resolve before the Colorado Supreme Court
seriously considered the merits of the case.
1. The First Hurdle: Getting to the Merits
Procedural issues delayed the lower courts in Lobato for over 20
years. The first state court to consider the plaintiffs' claims granted
summary judgment for Taylor in 1986, holding that the plaintiffs' action
was barred in part by res judicata based on the earlier Torrens decision. 72
After the state court of appeals upheld the dismissal, in 1994 the
Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded, stating that the lower
court should have determined whether Taylor had satisfied due process
in the Torrens action before determining that the plaintiffs' claims would
be barred by res judicata. 73 The Colorado Supreme Court directed the
lower court to determine whether the notice provisions in the Torrens

70. Although they focused on the equitable doctrines of prescription and adverse
possession in the Torrens action, the Lobato plaintiffs also successfully based their claims on
the implied doctrines of easements by estoppel and prior use. See discussion supra notes
49-52.
71. For the remainder of this article, where relevant, "Torrens action" refers to the
Torrens action brought in the Salazar estate as well.
72. Rael v. Taylor, No. 81CV5 (Costilla County Dist. Ct. Sept. 22, 1986) (Judgment for
Defendant on Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for Summary Judgment), affid, Rael
v. Taylor, 832 P.2d 1011, 1013 (Colo. App. 1991). In affirming, the court of appeals rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that they were neither named nor in privity with those named in
the Torrens action, since the fact that they were successors in interest to the property
should have put them on notice as to the earlier actions. Id. at 1014.
73. Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210, 1229 (Colo. 1994). As to the effect of the Torrens
decree, the court explained that res judicata would only bar the claims of those persons not
personally named and served in the Torrens action if Taylor had made a diligent inquiry
into the identity of all reasonably ascertainable claimants. Id. at 1226-27.
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action were constitutional and to hold a trial on the merits for those
plaintiffs who did not receive adequate notice. 74
On remand in 1997, the trial court bifurcated the proceedings,
first determining that ten of the plaintiffs had not received adequate
notice in the Torrens actions and therefore could not be bound by the
decrees. 7 As to those plaintiffs, the court held an eight-day bench trial in
which the plaintiffs presented 22 witnesses, including four experts, and
the defense presented one witness. 76 The trial court ultimately ruled for
the defendants. It held that the Beaubien document was too ambiguous
in describing the parties, location, and nature of the rights to have been a
valid source of the plaintiffs' asserted usufructuary rights, and that their
use was not sufficiently adverse to constitute a prescriptive claim. 77
Nonetheless, the extensive testimony presented at trial led the
district court to make several important factual findings. First, the
district court found that all of the plaintiffs' land titles traced back to
Charles Beaubien's ownership of the Grant. 78 Second, it determined that
the local landowners consistently exercised their rights on La Sierra from
the time of settlement under Beaubien until Taylor's purchase of the
ranch. 79 Finally, it concluded that the local community could not have
survived without access to La Sierra.80 Despite the lower court's ultimate
ruling, these favorable findings would prove crucial to the final outcome
of the case. First, however, the case went to the court of appeals, which
considered and rejected each of the plaintiffs' theories based on
reasoning that the state's highest court would strike down two years

later. 81
74. Id. at 1228-29. Specifically, the Court ordered the trial court to determine whether
Taylor used reasonable diligence in notifying those parties with an ascertainable interest in
La Sierra. Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821, 826 (Colo. App. 2000).
75. The court found that these plaintiffs had an identifiable interest in the property and
could reasonably have been identified and served in the Torrens action. Lobato, 13 P.3d at
826.
76. Id. at 944; Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 37, at 12.
77. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 826, 830-31; Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 944 (Colo. 2002). Before
the merits phase, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' Mexican law claim, based on
Tameling, and denied class certification. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 826.
78. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 830.
79. Id.
80. Id. Specifically, the findings included the following: (1) plaintiffs' predecessors in
title grazed cattle and sheep, harvested timber, gathered firewood, fished, hunted, and
recreated on defendants' land from the 1800s; (2) none of the land was fenced prior to 1960,
and plaintiffs were never denied access to the land for the uses enumerated above; and (3)
the chain of title of all land now owned by plaintiffs and defendants extended from Charles
Beaubien in 1860. Id. See also Goldstein, supra note 20, at 189.
81. Because the appeals court affirmed the dismissal of Plaintiffs' claims on the merits,
it found it unnecessary to review the due process ruling. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 826.
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2. The Substantive Holdings Below
a. The Beaubien Document Did Not Grant Enforceable Rights
The court of appeals upheld the district court's rejection of
express rights based on the Beaubien document, holding that the
document did not meet the formal requirements of conveying interests
to land under 1863 Colorado property law. 82 First, the court of appeals
held that the document was insufficiently clear as to the intended parties
and location of the rights.83 As had occurred in the Tierra Amarilla
litigation, the court highlighted the document's general reference to the
grantees as "community members" and "inhabitants" of the villages, as
well as its lack of specific language describing the land at issue, despite
clear testimony at trial that identified the land described in the document
the
as La Sierra.84 In addition, the court held that the document lacked
85
prendre.
A
profits
to
rights
devise
to
required
terms of inheritance
Further, the court of appeals rejected historical evidence of the
initial settlement and subsequent use of the land. The court held that this
evidence was irrelevant to interpreting the Beaubien document because
of the strict requirements for conveying these types of use rights. While
the court of appeals agreed with the plaintiffs' argument that the
Id. at 829-32.
Id. at 830-32. Specifically, the court wrote:
[Uinder the law in effect in Colorado territory in 1863, a document
conveying any interest in real property had to meet certain formal
requirements, including the requirement that it contain "the christian and
surnames of the.. grantees.. and.. .an accurate description of the premises,
or the interest in the premises intended to be conveyed."
Id. at 831 (citing General Laws of the Territory of Colorado, Act Concerning Conveyances
of Real Estate § 2 (1861)). Plaintiffs first argued on appeal that the lower court's rejection of
the document as a valid conveyance was based on its misinterpretation of nineteenth
century property laws and canons for construing documents. See Appellants' Opening
Brief, supra note 37, at 25-27 ("While these complex legal provisions provided a convenient
path for the court of appeals to escape the maze of substantive issues presented for review,
application of these technical laws, without reference to, and analysis of, the entire 1863
statutory scheme, was erroneous."). The Lobato court ultimately avoided this entire
discussion by accepting the plaintiffs' theory that their use rights were valid under the law
of servitudes.
84. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 831.
85. Id. ("[T]o the extent the rights purportedly granted in the Beaubien document are
profits A prendre in gross-that is, personal rights held distinct from any ownership of
land-the document did not contain [the words of limitation "and heirs and assigns"]
required under then-existing Colorado law to pass such rights on to the original
inhabitants' successors, including plaintiffs."). A "profit A prendre," or "profit," is "an
easement that confers the right to enter and remove timber, minerals, oil, gas, game, or
other substances from land in the possession of another." Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 945
82.
83.

(Colo. 2002) (citing RESTATEMENT (TIHIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 1.2(2)).
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asserted rights could be characterized as profits A prendre, it
distinguished these rights from access easements. 86 Although similar to
easements in many aspects, the court of appeals held that, unlike
easements, profits A prendre must be granted by express language and
that extrinsic, historical evidence could not aid an ambiguous
87
conveyance.
Thus, while the court of appeals conceded that the Beaubien
document set forth "certain rights and privileges to be had by settlers
residing in towns located within the boundaries of the Sangre de Cristo
grant," it nonetheless refused to hold that the Beaubien document
created an express grant. 88 In doing so, the court of appeals rejected the
landowners' argument that the document should be broadly construed
89
and its language contextualized.
b. The Asserted Rights Could Not Be Implied under the Law of
Servitudes
The appeals court similarly refused to apply equitable doctrines
to the plaintiffs' claims. The plaintiffs had argued that their usufructuary
rights were enforceable based on implication and under the doctrine of
prescription. The court of appeals rejected these arguments by
distinguishing the plaintiffs' asserted rights from easements to which the
laws of implied servitudes would apply, and by imposing strict
requirements for proving prescriptive rights to open land. 90
The court of appeals first characterized the plaintiffs' asserted
rights as profits A prendre in gross, rather than rights appurtenant to the
land, and concluded that, unlike easements, profits in gross could not be
established by implication. 91 Easements, the court stated, confer
privileges to access another's land, without granting the right to take
anything of value, while profits A prendre represent the right to take a

86. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 832. In distinguishing Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965
P.2d 1229 (Colo. 1998), the case relied upon by the plaintiffs, the court characterized Lazy
Dog as having dealt with easements, rather than profits, and disagreed with the plaintiffs'
interpretation that Lazy Dog allowed extrinsic evidence whenever a document is
ambiguous. Loba to, 13 P.3d at 832.
87. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 832. Further, the appeals court elaborated that, even if extrinsic
evidence were permissible in this instance, such evidence was presented at trial but was
insufficient to establish that the document conveyed enforceable rights. Id.
88. Id. at 829, 833.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 821.
91. Id. at 832-33. An "appurtenant" right is "[slomething that belongs or is attached to
something else," while rights "in gross" are personal rights unconnected to the dominant
estate. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 98, 786 (7th ed. 1999); Lobato, 71 P.3d at 945.
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product or part of the land itself. 92 Based on a narrow interpretation of
earlier Colorado easement cases, the court held that, in contrast to
easements, extrinsic evidence could not be used to imply rights to the
more valuable profits. 93 The appeals court therefore refused to enforce
the landowners' rights absent express language. 94
The appeals court also rejected the plaintiffs' prescriptive claims.
It held that the community's historic use of La Sierra was neither
exclusive nor adverse, despite the plaintiffs' theory that adversity should
95
be presumed under Colorado's law of prescriptive easements. Again,
the court of appeals distinguished the rules for access easements from
those relevant to the types of profits at issue, explaining that "the public"
may not acquire profits by prescription, because such use would exhaust
the profits claimed. 96 Further, the court stated that the local community's
use was defeated by its essentially "permissive" use of the mountain
97
tract.
The plaintiffs appealed each of these issues to the state supreme
court. Certainly the decision threatened to go the same way as earlier
opinions. However, in June 2002, the Lobato court reversed 40 years of
state and federal court opinions by upholding the usufructuary rights of
the local landowners. In doing so, Lobato turned what had been a legal
morass, riddled with archaic property doctrines and inconsistent
precedent, into an important victory for the local community and land
grant advocates throughout the Southwest.
III. THE LOBATO DECISION AND HOW THE COURT GOT THERE
A. The Minefields Avoided: What Lobato Did Not Do
Instrumental to the Lobato decision was the Colorado Supreme
Court's use of the modem Restatement of Servitudes and Colorado
92. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 952 (citing Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. Fling, 396 P.2d 599
(Colo.1964)).
93. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 832-33 (citing Proper v. Greager, 827 P.2d 591 (Colo. App. 1992)).
94. Id. at 831-32.
95. Id. at 834-35. The appeals court also rejected plaintiffs' arguments that their
continuous use of La Sierra should have put Taylor on notice in order to establish or
presume prescription, particularly given the presence of ranch managers who supervised
the Taylor Ranch. Id.
96. See id. at 834. The historical requirement of exclusivity defeated similar prescriptive
claims in the Tierra Amarilla litigation. See Martinez v. Mundy, 295 P.2d 209 (N.M. 1956)
("The claim being in common with and similar to that of the general public in this area, the
[successors of the hijuela grantees] certainly could not acquire a private easement unto
themselves.").
97. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 834-35.
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easement cases to emphasize the equitable concepts of honoring original
intent and avoiding injustice. However, perhaps equally important to the
court's resolution of the case were those issues that the courts avoided
altogether.
In crafting the Lobato opinion, the court had to navigate pitfalls
that for decades had thwarted a resolution of this and other land grant
cases. While the careful organization of the opinion conveys a sense of
inevitability, the court's succinct conclusions were far from inevitable.
One of the most significant pitfalls was the legal problem presented by
Tameling and arguments about the relevance of the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo to the plaintiffs' claims. 98 The court avoided having to directly
confront these issues of Mexican and Treaty law by identifying the
common law as the exclusive source of the plaintiffs' legal rights. 99 Thus,
the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that their rights derived from
Mexican law and that the United States was bound to respect them
under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but unlike the lower courts,
Lobato avoided any mention of Tameling.100 The opinion simply stated
that Mexican law never applied because the Grant was settled after
Mexico ceded the territory to the United States in 1848.101 Although this
conclusion ignored important legal questions about the nature of the
Grant, thereby doing little to vindicate Mexican or Treaty law, it
nonetheless allowed the court to import evidence of Mexican law and
custom into its common law analysis.
B. How the Restatement of Servitudes and Colorado Equity Law Bailed
Out the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo
While Lobato affirmed the lower courts on the Mexican and
Treaty law issue, it reversed the court of appeals on the issue of implied
98. See discussion supra Part II.B (explaining that Tameling precluded courts from
reviewing the contours of the land grant after Congress's de novo confirmation in 1860).
99. Lobato, 71 P.3d 938, 945-46.
100. Id.
101. Id. The court's exclusive focus on those rights created under American law
obviated the need to legally define the Sangre de Cristo Grant as a private, community, or
empresario grant under Mexican law, again avoiding the problem of dealing with rights and
obligations created by Mexican law. The court merely explained that the Grant was made
to two men "for the purpose of settlement" and focused the rest of its attention on the legal
function and intent of the Beaubien document in common law terms. Id. at 943. Still, in
describing the Grant this way, the opinion clearly treated the Sangre de Cristo Grant as a
private grant- a feature that distinguishes it from the number of community grants in New
Mexico. For a description of other private land grants made by Governor Armijo during the
"Mexican period," see EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 24-27. See also EBRIGHT, supra note 36, at 4-6
(distinguishing community and private land grants).
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rights, holding that the rights set forth in the Beaubien document were
implied by prescription, estoppel, and prior use. In doing so, Lobato
followed what it characterized as a modern trend of simplifying the law
of servitudes based on concepts of equity, and abandoning the
unnecessary, legal technicalities long associated with the common law of
servitudes. 102
1. The Settlement Rights Were Profits

The court's first step was to re-characterize the rights described
in the Beaubien document to make them cognizable as equitable
servitudes. The lower courts had rejected the plaintiffs' claims of express
and implied rights to La Sierra by distinguishing these usufructuary
interests from traditional easements. This had prevented the landowners
from using historical evidence to interpret the rights implied in the
Beaubien document or from applying the equitable laws of implied
easements. 103 Thus, the Lobato court held that the plaintiffs' asserted
rights to La Sierra were profits A prendre, 1°4 but then expressly rejected
the lower courts' parsimonious distinction between profits and
easements, following the new Restatement's approach of equating the two
different interests for purposes of creating and conveying rights. 10 5 The
court then defined profits as easements to which the law of implied
10 6
easements applied.

102. See Lobato, 71 P.3d at 953 n.ll (quoting Introduction, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, at 3: "Notably, one of the goals of the Restatement is to 'present [] a
comprehensive modem treatment of the law of servitudes that substantially simplifies and
clarifies one of the most complex and archaic bodies of 20th century American law....It is
designed to allow both traditional and innovative land-development practices using
servitudes without imposing artificial constraints as to form or arbitrary limitations as to
substance."). See also RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 (1944).
103. See discussion supra notes 29-30.
104. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 945.
105. Id. at 952-53.
106. Id. at 945, 950. The modem Restatement erases technical distinctions between
different types of servitudes by combining easements, equitable servitudes, and covenants
into a single category of servitudes. Id. at 945 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 1.2). An earlier version of the Restatement applied the same rules to profits A
prendre and easements, since they both describe interests in the land of another.
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 Special N. (1944). While the Third Restatement
revived the term "profit" for descriptive purposes, the same rules still govern profits and
easements. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 952 n.10 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 1.2 Reporter's N.). In following the approach of the modem Restatement, the
Lobato court expressly disagreed with the court of appeals, which had concluded that
different rules may apply to profits and easements. Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821, 827
(Colo. App. 2000).
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Crucial to the court's treatment of these settlement rights as a
type of easement was the Restatement of Servitude's overall simplification
of the law of servitudes10 7 Calling this area one of the "most complex
and archaic bodies of 20th Century American law," 108 the authors of the
Restatement chose to eliminate the nuanced distinctions between
equitable interests to better serve the policy and purpose behind such
doctrines. 109 The new Restatement collectively defines servitudes,
easements, profits, and covenants as "servitudes" for the purpose of
asserting one's interest in the land of another.110 Similarly, the
Restatement treats profits as a type of easement for purposes of proving
one's rights to another's land. These simplified definitions eliminate the
technical distinctions that had developed for each individual interest and
often prevented claimants from satisfying any of them."'

In defining profits Aprendre as a type of easement, to which the same rules applied,
the court also rejected the lower courts' reliance on Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. Fling, 396 P.2d
599 (Colo. 1964), which had declined to uphold the plaintiffs' implied rights to fish in
defendant's lake when the parties' contract had expressly limited plaintiffs to right to boat
and swim. Unlike the lower courts, the Lobato court distinguished Fling as a case limited by
an express contract, rather than as announcing a distinction between the rules for
easements (e.g., boating) and profits (e.g., fishing). See Lobato, 71 P.3d at 952 (citing
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 450 Special N., § 1.2 (1944)).
107. On appeal, the plaintiffs had relied on this "streamlined" interpretation of the law
of servitudes to convince the high court that it was appropriate to consider extrinsic
evidence in order to understand the meaning of the document. See Appellants' Opening
Brief, supra note 37, at 31 ("Although the complexity of this subject of servitudes seems to
have stymied the lower courts, between reference to the simplified Restatement principles
and long-standing Colorado law, the analysis of this subject now is considerably easier.
The law has not changed, it has just been streamlined for ease of application.").
108. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 953 n.ll (quoting Introduction, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, at 3: "This Restatement presents a comprehensive modem
treatment of the law of servitudes that substantially simplifies and clarifies one of the most
complex and archaic bodies of 20th century American law... .It is designed to allow both
traditional and innovative land-development practices using servitudes, without imposing
artificial constraints as to form or arbitrary limitations as to substance.").
109. See id. at 951 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.12 cmt. a,
to highlight the rationale for recognizing easements based on prior use) ("The rule stated in
this section is not based solely on the presumed actual intent of the parties. It furthers the
policy of protecting reasonable expectations, as well as actual intent, of parties to land
transactions.").
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, Tentative Draft No. 1 (1989),
Introduction xxiii-xxvi; see id. § 2.2, cmt. d. (2000) ("Although labels are not determinative,
the terms "easement," "profit," "covenant" and "servitude" normally indicate that a
servitude is intended.").
111. For instance, recognizing the outdated, technical requirements for the doctrine of
prescription discussed supra, the Restatement now allows a plaintiff to meet the
requirements of prescription by proving either adverse use or an imperfectly conveyed title.
See Lobato, 71 P.3d at 953-55.
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Having recognized the plaintiffs' settlement claims as servitudes,
the remainder and bulk of the Lobato opinion outlined the legal sources of
these servitudes. The court ultimately upheld these rights under the
doctrines of prescription, estoppel, and implied use, as informed by the
1863 Beaubien document, its historical context, and the plaintiffs' historic
u2
use of La Sierra.

2. The Beaubien Document Was a Source of Enforceable Rights

Although the Lobato court held that the Beaubien document
failed to satisfy the requirements of an express grant, it held that the
document, while ambiguous on its face, was nonetheless a source of
implied rights to La Sierra.113 By relying on Colorado's law of
interpreting easements, the court used Mexican law and custom, not as a
source of law, but to help understand what Beaubien had intended when
he created the document.
Prior to the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Lobato, it was
sharply debated whether courts should allow such historical evidence to
ascertain the nature and location of the rights described in the document
and to determine if these corresponded to the plaintiffs' asserted rights
to La Sierra. The answer depended largely on whether the Beaubien
document was considered ambiguous (and how to make such a
determination) under Colorado easement law, as well as whether the law
of easements could apply to profits in the first place. 114 Here Lobato
explicitly reversed the lower courts, holding that, under Colorado
easement law, the document was ambiguous and any ambiguity should
be resolved by looking at the circumstances under which Beaubien
created the document. n5 To do so, the court followed Lazy Dog Ranch v.
Telluray Ranch Corp., which had relied on the equitable approach in the
new Restatement.116 Under Lazy Dog and the Restatement, Lobato held that

extrinsic evidence may be relevant to resolve whether an easement deed
is ambiguous and, if the deed is found to be ambiguous, to ascertain the
original intent of the parties.117 The court emphasized that "[i]t would be

112. The last section of the opinion then limited the scope of the plaintiffs' usufructuary
rights to La Sierra to pasture, firewood, and timber. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 956.
113. Id. at 946-49.
114. See Lobato v. Taylor, 13 P.3d 821, 831-32 (Colo. App. 2000).
115. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 947-48.
116. Lazy Dog Ranch v. Telluray Ranch Corp., 965 P.2d 1229, 1235-37 (Colo. 1998).
117. The Lobato court clearly disagreed with the court of appeals, which had
distinguished Lazy Dog as a case about easements rather than profits, and found that Lazy
Dog did not apply since it considered the Beaubien document to be "patently
unambiguous" on its face. Lobato, 13 P.3d at 832; Lazy Dog, 965 P.2d at 1235 (citing
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the height of arrogance and nothing but a legal fiction for us to claim that
we can interpret this document without putting it in its historical
context." 118 To interpret the Beaubien document, the court considered
those factors used in Lazy Dog: the character of the relevant property and
surrounding area, the subsequent use of the property, and the nature of a
development plan for the area. 119
The Lobato court used these same factors to reason that La Sierra
was the tract of land that Beaubien intended to burden with the settlement rights. 120 The court was heavily influenced by evidence showing
that the resources described in the Beaubien document were uniquely
available on La Sierra.121 The court also relied on the trial court's findings
that the plaintiffs and their predecessors had exercised these rights on La
Sierra for over 100 years. 122 Lastly, the court was persuaded by the
language in Taylor's deed, which explicitly referred to the "settlement
rights" of the local community, confirming that the plaintiffs' asserted
rights attached to the land that Taylor purchased. 123
The court used a similar analysis to conclude that, in his 1863
document, Beaubien intended to grant appurtenant rights, or rights that
would run permanently with the land, rather than those rights being in
gross and belonging only to the first settlers. 124 Here again, the court
used Spanish and Mexican law and custom to illuminate what the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES, Tentative Draft No. 4,1994). As discussed

in Lazy Dog:
[T]he Restatement (Third) of Property has eschewed a strict "four corners"
rule in favor of a more context-based inquiry. The Restatement (Third) of
Property first notes that "a servitude should be interpreted to give effect to
and be consistent with the intention of the parties to an expressly created
servitude." [The Restatement] explains further that "the intention of the
parties to an expressly created servitude is ascertained from the
servitude's language interpreted in light of all of the circumstances."
Id. (internal citations omitted). Further, Lazy Dog explained that the concept of examining
deeds in light of surrounding circumstances was far from novel, having been recognized in
the first Restatement as necessary when the language of a document is unclear or
incomplete. Id. at 1236. The court stated that the "weight and momentum of authority,"
including other jurisdictions as well as the Restatement, favored the more flexible,
contextual approach. Id.
118. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 947.
119. Id. at 947-48; Lazy Dog, 965 P.2d at 1235, 1237.
120. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 948 (holding that the location of the rights to pasture, water,
firewood, and timber in the Beaubien document was La Sierra, based on evidence of both
the nature of the land itself and the historical use of the local community).
121. Id. (citing Dr. Marianne Stoller's report and testimony at trial).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 938, 949-50. For a definition of "gross" and "appurtenant" rights, see supra
note 91.
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parties must have understood the Beaubien document to mean. 12 The
court cited contemporary land grant scholarship to explain the Mexican
settlement system at the time. It emphasized that common access to
resources such as pasture for grazing and wood to heat and frame their
homes was a necessary incentive to attract settlers, supplement their vara
strips, 126 and maintain these subsistence-based communities. 127 For
private land grants such as the Sangre de Cristo Grant, which might pass
through many hands, appurtenant rights to the land insured the
permanent viability of these settlement communities. 128 Stating that
easements are presumed to run with servient estates, the court
concluded that the settlement rights were easements that legally
connected the settlers' valley plots with necessary resources on the
mountain tract. 129

125. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 949.
126. A vara was a common unit of measurement in Mexico and Spain that amounted to
just under a yard. The vara strips along the Culebra valley are narrow strips of individually
owned, cultivated land with frontage on a stream for irrigation purposes. See Stoller, supra
note 9, at 14-15.
127. For an explanation of the system of private and community land grants under
Spanish and Mexican law, see EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 23. For a description of subsistence
patterns under the Mexican system of land tenure, see IRA G. CLARK, WATER IN NEW
MEXICO, A HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT AND USE 34 (1987). The court explained that Mexican
land grants of this period were designed to secure the northern frontier by establishing
permanent agricultural and pastoral communities in these sparsely populated areas, and
that the territorial governor conveyed large tracts of land to individuals such as Beaubien
with the express condition that they would attract settlers to the grant. See Tameling v. U.S.
Freehold Land & Emigration Co., 2 Colo. 411,416 (1874), affd, 93 U.S. 644 (1876).
It is well known as a matter of history, that from a time coeval with the
establishment by Spain of colonies in this country the king and likewise
his provincial governors, were in the habit of making extensive grants of
land to individuals for pastoral, agricultural and colonization purposes.
After Mexico had achieved her independence, the same policy was
pursued by the supreme and local governments of that country.
Id. At trial, Dr. Marianne Stoller testified that the land that the villagers historically
accessed on La Sierra matched the land described in the Beaubien document. See Lobato v.
Taylor, 13 P.3d 821, 832 (Colo. App. 2000). Further, the court noted that the 1864 agreement
between Beaubien's heirs and William Gilpin, written pursuant to an oral agreement
between Beaubien and Gilpin, further confirmed that these settlement rights ran with the
land. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 949. The document specifically recognized the settlement rights to
the land by stating that the "express condition that the settlement rights before then
conceded by said Charles Beaubien to residents of Costilla, Culebra & Trinchera, within
said Tract included, shall be confirmed by the said William Gilpin as confirmed by him."
Id.
128. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 949 n.7 (distinguishing the importance of access rights to a
private grant from those to a community grant, since the fact that communal lands were
held by the community in perpetuity ensured permanent access to them).
129. Id. at 949-50.
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3. The Rights Were Enforceableas Implied Servitudes
In upholding the settlement rights as implied easements, the
court flatly rejected the lower courts' conclusion that the rights at issue
were profits to which prescription and other implied rights could not
apply under the law of servitudes. After determining that Beaubien
intended to convey these rights in his 1863 deed, but did so imperfectly,
the court relied heavily on the Restatement of Servitudes and Colorado
130
easement law to uphold the plaintiffs' rights as implied servitudes.
The court relied on the modem Restatement's focus on fairness
and honoring the original intent of the parties, particularly regarding
131
conveyances that were clearly intended yet imperfectly executed.
Absent express language, it stated that an easement could be implied by
circumstances that illustrate the original parties' intent to create such
claims under the
interests. 132 The court then upheld the plaintiffs'
133
doctrines of prescription, estoppel, and prior use.
Rights by Prescription, Estoppel, and Prior Use
The court first upheld the asserted rights under the doctrine of
prescription. In contrast to the absolute requirement of adversity that the
lower courts demanded for proving a prescriptive claim, the Lobato court
used the approach taken by the modem Restatement, which allowed an
easement by prescription if the asserted use was shown to be (1) open or
130. The court rejected the court of appeals' conclusion that the law of implied
easements exclusively applied to access rights and was inapplicable to profits or use rights.
See Lobato, 13 P.3d at 832-33 (relying on Alexander Dawson, Inc. v. Fling, 155 Colo.599, 396
P.2d 599 (1964)). The Lobato court explained that the appeals court had overstated Fling,
which failed to find implied use rights when the terms of a deed expressly limited the
plaintiffs to certain uses. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 952. Thus, Fling did not apply to the Lobato
claims of implied rights, where the document at issue did not express a contrary intent. Id.
Rather, Lobato emphasized the "modem trend" of applying the same equitable concepts
equally to all servitudes, whether access easements or profits a prendre, as both types of
interests involved the same policy and practical concerns of effectuating a party's intent
when they fail to comply with strict common law rules of conveyance. Id. (citing
RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, supra note 85, § 450 Special N. (1944)).
131. Lobato, 71 P.3d at 950 ("This well-established area of property law is concerned
with honoring the intentions of the parties to land transactions and avoiding injustice.").
132. Id. at 946-50.
133. The court recognized that, in the absence of a legally sufficient conveyance, the
rights must nonetheless satisfy an exception to the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 938, 950 (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.1). Such exceptions include implied

servitudes created by prescription, estoppel, prior use, or "other circumstances
surrounding the conveyance of other interests in land, which give rise to the inference that
the parties intended to create a servitude." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY:
SERVITUDES § 2.8 cmt. b).
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notorious, (2) continuous without effective interruption for 18 years
(Colorado's statutory time period), and (3) either adverse or pursuant to
an attempted but ineffectively conveyed grant. 34 Lobato held that the
plaintiffs' historical evidence of open use and the language of the
Beaubien and Gilpin documents, as well as subsequent deeds, satisfied
the first prong of open or notorious use. 135 The court held that the second
prong for a prescriptive claim was satisfied by the continuous,
uninterrupted use from the mid-1800s until 1960, as found by the trial
court.136 Finally and most notably, Lobato held that, under the liberalized
third prong of the recent Restatement, the Beaubien document provided
ample evidence of Beaubien's intent to convey usufructuary rights to La
Sierra.137 This evidence was supported by language in subsequent deeds
to the mountain tract and by evidence of customary settlement
practices.3 Citing Colorado case law that omitted the requirement of
adversity for prescriptive easements, the court held that the prescriptive
claim was not defeated by the fact that the community's historic use was
139
permissive rather than adverse.
The court also held that the plaintiffs established implied rights
under the implied doctrine of estoppel.140 In doing so, the court
highlighted Colorado's practice of recognizing equitable rights even
when parties cannot meet the express requirements of the common
law.14' The court again relied on the approach taken by the modem
Restatement, which eliminated the requirement of deception or misrepre-

134. Id. at 950 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.17).
135. Id. at 954.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 954-55 (citing Wright v. Horse Creek Ranches, 697 P.2d 384, 388 (Colo. 1985);
Proper v. Greager, 827 P.2d 591, 595-96 (Colo. App. 1992)).
140. Id. at 950-51.
141. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.10). The court found
useful a number of early twentieth century Colorado ditch cases that upheld ditch
easements through estoppel, without a requirement of deception, thus agreeing with
plaintiffs that ditch rights were analogous to the settlement rights in Lobato. See id. at 951
(citing Graybill v. Corlett, 60 Colo. 551, 154 P. 730, 730-31 (Colo. 1916) (upholding a
landowner's right to use and maintain a water ditch across his neighbor's land when the
parties had made an oral promise upon which the ditch user relied for irrigation); Hoeyne
Ditch Co. v. John Flood Ditch Co., 68 Colo. 538, 191 P. 108, 111 (Colo. 1920) (upholding a
ditch user's equitable right to use defendant's ditch pursuant to an oral promise, by
applying the "well settled" rule that, "although an oral contract relating to realty is within
the statute [of frauds], where a consideration has passed, and it has been fully performed
by both parties and possession taken in pursuance thereof, the bar of the statute is removed
and equity will enforce the right thus acquired")).
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The
sentation from the traditional common law doctrine of estoppel.
servient
of
the
owner
the
Beaubien,
for
reasonable
it
was
that
held
court
estate, to anticipate that the settlers would substantially change their
positions based on the promise of usufructuary rights, because this was
(1) customary under Mexican law, (2) intended by Beaubien (as
evidenced by the relevant documents and actual practice), and (3)
necessary in light of expert testimony about the need for the unique
resources of the mountain tract. 143 The court further concluded that
Beaubien's solicitations and the settlers' relocation to the Sangre de
Cristo Grant demonstrated that the settlers substantially changed their
44
positions by reasonably relying on such a belief. The court emphasized
that it would be an injustice not to recognize the plaintiffs' usufructuary
and the
rights, given Beaubien's clear intent to convey such rights
145
predecessors.
their
and
them
by
made
significant sacrifices
Finally, the court upheld the plaintiffs' rights based on the
Restatement's definition of implied easement by prior use, a doctrine long
recognized in Colorado. 146 Under the modem Restatement's analysis, the
court held that (1) Beaubien had originally owned both the mountain
147
(2) the settlers exercised
tract and the usufructuary rights thereto,
these rights before Beaubien legally severed them, 148 (3) the usufructuary
149
(4) these settlement
rights were permanent rather than temporary,
rights were reasonably necessary to the subsistence of the settlers and
15°
and (5) Beaubien had
their successors on the Sangre de Cristo Grant,
5
' As to this last
contrary.'
the
to
intent
not shown any express or implicit

142. Id. at 950-51.
143. Id. at 955-56.
144. Id. According to the court, "reasonable reliance" depended on the nature of the
transaction and the sophistication of the parties. Id.
145. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.10). The court
emphasized that Beaubien had lured the plaintiffs' predecessors to the northern frontier by
promising ample resources for their subsistence needs. Further, the settlers arguably
fulfilled the condition of the Sangre de Cristo Grant by settling the land with a permanent
agricultural community, thereby enabling Beaubien to secure his title to the Grant. Id.
146.

Id. at 951-52 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: SERVITUDES § 2.12; Lee v.

Sch. Dist. No. R-1 in Jefferson County, 435 P.2d 232, 235-36 (Colo. 1967); Proper v. Greager,
827 P.2d 591, 593 (Colo. App. 1992)).
147. Id. at 956 (citing Tameling v. U.S. Freehold Land & Emigration Co., 2 Colo.411,413
(Colo. Terr. 1874)).
148. Id. (relying on testimony that the resources from the mountain tract were essential
to survival in the San Luis Valley, indicating that the settlers must have exercised these
rights before Beaubien memorialized them in 1863).
149. Id.
150. Id. Again, this finding relied heavily on the lower court's findings of fact and
mirrored the arguments in the estoppel claim.
151. Id.
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element, the court held that, in fact, given Mexican customary practice,
the language from the documents, and the expectations of the parties,
Beaubien and the land grant settlers, as well as their successors,
understood that Beaubien had conveyed to the settlers usufructuary
152
rights to La Sierra.
4. The Scope of the Rights
After recognizing the plaintiffs' rights to La Sierra as implied
servitudes under the doctrines of prescription, estoppel, and prior use,
the majority then significantly limited the scope of those rights to include
only the timber and firewood necessary for each household and
sufficient pasture for each family's livestock, but not the right to hunt,
fish, or recreate on the mountain tract. 153 The court retained jurisdiction
to determine the scope of the class entitled to claim these rights. 154 On
April 28, 2003, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the rights to
pasture, timber, and firewood on La Sierra were available to all Costilla
County landowners or their predecessors who were not named and
served in the earlier Torrens actions and were able to trace their title to
the initial settlement of the Sangre de Cristo Grant.155 The court

152. Id.
153. Id. In his dissent, Justice Martinez argued that, under the same analysis used by the
majority, the plaintiffs' had proven these latter rights as well, based on evidence of the
importance of these rights at the time of settlement and the community's historic use of
these rights. Id. at 958-62 (Martinez, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 957.
155. Lobato v. Taylor, 70 P.3d 1152, 1156 (Colo. 2003), as modified on denial of
rehearing (June 16, 2003) [hereinafter Lobato I/]. This included all settlement during William
Gilpin's ownership of the Grant beginning in 1864, described in supra note 129. Id. at 115859. Specifically, on remand landowners must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that their land was owned or occupied by the settlers during the time that Gilpin
owned the property. Id. The court also required the Defendants (formerly Taylor, then exEnron executive Lou Pai) to pay the costs of identifying and serving all individuals who
have usufructuary rights to La Sierra,as defined in the 2002 Lobato case:
In light of our holding that Taylor failed to exercise reasonable diligence in
personally naming and serving all reasonably ascertainable individuals
with an identifiable interest in the Taylor Ranch, the costs of remedying
this failure on remand must be borne by Taylor. In Colorado, costs are
awarded to the prevailing party unless mandated otherwise by statute.
C.R.C.P. 54(d). Because the plaintiff landowners have prevailed on their
claims, Taylor now must pay the costs associated with identifying and
notifying all persons who have access rights to the Taylor Ranch.
Id. at 1167; Deborah Frazier, Ranch Opened After 44 Years: Families Regain Access to Land Once
Used by Ancestors, RocKY MTN. NEWS, June 12, 2004, at 13A. Further, the court allowed the
plaintiffs to raise the class certification issue again to the trial court on remand. Lobato II, 70
P.3d at n.14.
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15 6
remanded these issues to the trial court in Costilla County. On June 11,
2004, District Judge Gaspar Perricone, the same judge who had rejected
the plaintiffs' claims over 20 years before, granted nine families
immediate access to La Sierra and set up a year-long process for
identifying and tracing the titles of an estimated 1000 additional
successors to the original settlers who were not personally notified in the
earlier Torrens action. 157 As of this writing, Judge Perricone had
extended this access to about 100 people earlier this year and to an
additional 400 in July. The next round of claims will be considered later
158
this year.

IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE LOBATO LEAVES LAND GRANT
LITIGATION: IMPLICATIONS, CRITICISMS, AND
DISTINCTIONS WITHOUT A DIFFERENCE
While the 40-year case has taken a monumental toll on San Luis
and its neighboring communities and local landowners still have a long
way to go to reclaim their lost rights to La Sierra, the Lobato decision
provides courts with important tools for enforcing land claims with
cultural and legal roots in Mexico or Spain. Its approach also presents
some interesting ironies. For instance, Lobato suggests that ambiguities in
historical documents may allow courts to look outside the language of a
document to its surrounding circumstances, rather than necessarily
1 59
preventing the creation of valid rights. Thus, in Lobato, the ambiguity
and lack of specificity in the Beaubien document became the document's
greatest strength rather than its fatal flaw. Similarly, the court's approach
to construing a grant that was attempted but ineffectively conveyed took
advantage of another type of ambiguity. Rather than acting as a bar to
claimants' rights, in Lobato this legal imperfection was an important tool
for circumventing the traditional requirement of adversity to prove a
prescriptive claim.
Perhaps yet another irony is that, by avoiding Tameling's bar to
claims based on Mexican law, Lobato seemed to suggest that, the later in
time the land grant, the more likely courts are to enforce claims based on
156. Lobato II, 70 P.3d at 1156.
157. Sylvia Lobato, Land Grant Heirs Win Vital Victory: Judge Rules Against Owners of
Taylor Ranch, Ensures Access, VALLEY COURIER (San Luis Valley, Colorado), June 12, 2004, at
1. Judge Perricone additionally ordered Defendants to pay an estimated $100,000 in costs
for the title search, and denied Defendants' motions to restrict and further delay access to
the property. Frazier, supranote 155.
158. Christopher Ortiz, Court Gives Access to Ranch in San Luis, DENVER POST, July 27,
2005, at B1.
159. See generally Tierra Amarilla cases cited in supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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American law. While the court's analysis was tailored to the unique facts
surrounding the 1863 Beaubien document, its contextual approach is
certainly applicable to other large, private grants made during the end of
Mexican rule over New Mexican territory. 160 Many of the facts in Lobato
are shared by other New Mexican land grants, such as the size,
conditionality, time period, and purpose of the original Sangre de Cristo
Grant. 161 In many of these instances, land was conveyed to individuals
or communities with the purpose and condition of settling the northern
border, and subsequent deeds or hijuelas represented the fulfillment of
these conditions. The Lobato court found it significant that it was
"attempting to construe a 150 year-old document written in Spanish
by a
French Canadian who obtained a conditional grant to an enormous land
area under Mexican law and perfected it under American law."' 62
Therefore, perhaps most importantly, Lobato suggests that, under the
common law, rights to other land grants, such as the Tierra Amarilla
Grant, must be read in light of the Mexican law and custom that
surrounded and informed them.
While Lobato may help vindicate land grant claims to which the
American common law may apply, the court arguably did little to
advance efforts to vindicate Mexican and international treaty law. 163
Here, the court avoided a principled analysis of the rights to the Land
Grant under Mexican law, sidestepping the plaintiffs' Mexican law
claims by simply concluding that the Grant was settled after 1863. 164 By
160. See Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 947 (Colo. 2002) ("[Wle find that the document,
when taken together with the other unique facts of this case, establishes a prescriptive
easement, an easement by estoppel, and an easement from prior use.") (emphasis added).
161. Id. Also important to the Lobato court was the fact that the Beaubien document
seemed to "memorialize commitments he had made to induce families to move hundreds
of miles to make homes in the wilderness," circumstances that are indeed true for land
grant settlers throughout present-day New Mexico. Id. While private, Mexican-period land
grants such as the Maxwell and Pablo Montoya grants may not share the important
documentary history of La Sierra, in which each post-1863 deed to the mountain tract
referred to the claims of the local community, they nonetheless share many of the
persuasive factors in the Lobato case.
162. Id.
163. For an analysis of the Treaty and Mexican-law issues presented by the Taylor
Ranch case, see Brief of Amici Curiae, Rael v. Taylor, 876 P.2d 1210 (Colo. 1994) (No.
92SC74). See generally Placido G6mez, The History and Adjudication of the Common Lands of
Spanish and Mexican Land Grants, 25 NAT. RESOURCES J.1039 (1985) (discussing the creation
and adjudication of common lands in northern New Mexico land grants, including the
Sangre de Cristo Grant).
164. For instance, while Lobato relied on Mexican law and custom to inform the intent
and expectations of the parties in 1863, it failed to discuss the type of grant created under
Mexican law or whether this was relevant to the reasonableness of the parties' reliance, in
light of the legal customs of the time. See discussion supra, Part III. While the Lobato court
treated the Sangre de Cristo Grant as essentially a private grant, there are different theories
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making Mexican law inapplicable as a source of law, Lobato raises some
important issues and ironies. Is it worth deemphasizing Treaty claims if
courts are able to vindicate land grant rights under the common law?
Does it justify perpetuating the loss of land grant claims to insist that
rights be based on Treaty and international law? Are courts the proper
place to wage these political battles, or is it enough to have courts
developing tools to chip away at historic injustices?
about what type of grant it actually was, with each theory bearing unique legal
implications, even under U.S. law. Cf. Garcfa & Howland, supra note 28, at 45 (describing
the Sangre de Cristo Grant as an empresario grant that contained both private land and
communal land and arguing that the Mexican settlers should have received title to the
mountain tract in common under Mexican law). For instance, if the grant was an empresario
or community grant in which the mountain tract was held in common, then the title to such
lands would have been lost under Sandoval. See id. at 45-46. See also discussion supra note
101 and accompanying text. On the other hand, if the use rights were legally created at the
time of the original land grant, then the United States was arguably obligated to apply
Mexican law or custom under the 1848 Treaty. See Appellants' Opening Brief, supra note 37,
at 15-16 (citing a number of experts who opined that the settlers' usufructuary rights were
created by the Grant and thus legally enforceable under Mexican law). According to
Plaintiffs, these rights were not affected by the 1860 Act of Congress, since the Surveyor
General had not recommended that Congress extinguish the settlement rights of the local
community and the Act only confirmed the claim "as recommended for confirmation by
said surveyor-general in his reports...." Id. at 18-19 (citing Act of June 21, 1860, ch. 167, 12
Stat. 71 (1860)). Further, the Act stated that "the foregoing confirmation shall only be
construed as quit-claims or relinquishments, on the part of the United States, and shall not
affect the adverse rights of any person or persons whomsoever." Id. at 19.
Likewise, by avoiding the legal status of the Grant under Mexican law, the court
failed to analyze whether the Grant was complete at the time it was granted in 1844, and, if
so, whether it was then subject to defeasement if the conditions of settlement were not met,
or, on the other hand, if the grant was based on conditions subsequent to its conveyance to
Beaubien and Lee, in which case the transfer was not actually complete until the land was
settled in the 1860s, when American law applied. In the first scenario, the Grant and the
settlement rights it contemplated would have been controlled by Mexican law and subject
to U.S. recognition under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, but the relevance of such law
was debatable under Tameling, under which Congress's 1860 confirmation would render
the Mexican legal conditions irrelevant. In the second scenario, because U.S. law clearly
controlled by 1863, the recognition that the Grant was incomplete or failed to vest may
have vitiated the plaintiffs' use of Mexican custom and practice to inform the intent of the
parties in 1863. See EBRIGHT, supra note 5, at 36-37.
Yet another argument is that the Grant never vested, since the vesting of the Sangre de
Cristo Grant was arguably conditional on settlement within two years. See Stoller, supra note
9, at 3. But see Garcia & Howland, supra note 28, at 42 (describing the conditions of fulfilling
land grants as being less important by this period, as the Mexican government was
increasingly desperate to settle northern lands in order to hold off American
advancements). According to this latter view, the Sangre de Cristo Grant may have been
reasonably understood as vested even without the conditions being fully satisfied, which
may have justified the settlers and their successors in relying on their usufructuary rights
as legally binding and enforceable. See Lobato, 71 P.3d at 955 (discussing the reasonable
expectations of the settlers under Mexican law and custom as applied to implied rights by
estoppel).
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Perhaps the real significance of Lobato is not the way it failed to
use Mexican, international, or treaty law, but the way it succeeded in
using the equitable tools of the common law in ways that will
undoubtedly prove useful to other courts and claimants. The court's
analysis of implied servitudes under the modem Restatement and the
equitable principles underlying its analysis will be far-reaching.
Furthermore, Lobato provides new tools for examining the historical
context of land grant claims in cases involving ambiguous historical
documents. Lobato proved that the common law is flexible enough to
recognize these historic claims to crucial resources in the Southwest.
The outcome in Lobato is in large part a testament to the
commitment, skill, and tenacity of the plaintiffs and their community,
supporters, and attomeys. 165 While the legal battle is over, the practical
resolution of the conflict is still unfolding. Those individuals whose titles
are traceable to the original settlers of the land grant now have the power
and responsibility to decide how to exercise their usufructuary rights to
La Sierra. The Land Rights Council in San Luis is currently creating a
sustainable land use plan for the estimated 1000 Costilla County
residents who will be able to access the resources on La Sierra.166
165. Still, the decision has come at an enormous cost. After losing access to La Sierra in
the 1960s, residents of San Luis and neighboring communities lost access to unique
resources that had sustained the local economy and culture for over a century, and a
generation has been deprived access to resources central to its economic and cultural wellbeing. Some estimate that 7500 residents left the community in the 1960s as a result of
Taylor's restricting access to the resources on La Sierra. Frazier, supra note 155. With an
economy based nearly entirely on farming and ranching, nearly 50 percent of Costilla
County residents received public assistance by 1990, ranking the county in the top two
statewide in terms of numbers of residents receiving public assistance. Stoller, supra note 9,
at 44, 58 (suggesting that some of this assistance would be unnecessary if residents were
allowed to access the mountain resources that their families traditionally used). The case
has generated tremendous amounts of court and attorney fees (although most of the legal
support has been pro bono), and countless hours and ultimately years gathering
documentation essential to the Taylor Ranch litigation. See Interview with Maria
Mondragon-Valdbz, supra note 43.
166. The Land Rights Council received a grant of $75,000 in late 2003 to prepare a
sustainable land use plan for La Sierra, which is currently being implemented by LRC
planning director Arnold Vald~z. The study includes research about the numbers of sheep
and cattle that were historically grazed on the mountain, as well as how much wood was
traditionally harvested. See Deborah Frazier, Land War Ends but New Battle Looms: Property
Owners Try to FigureHow to Share Landscape, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 13, 2003 (on file with
author) (noting statements of Maria Vald~z, who wrote the grant proposal for LRC); Taylor
Ranch Has New Owners, DAILY CAMTERA (Boulder, Colo.), Aug. 11, 2004 (on file with author).
As the land and its watershed have been plundered by timber interests since 1960, there is
certainly much to be healed. See Pablo Carlos Moya, Taylor Ranch DamageAppalling, Visitors
Find, PUEBLO CHIEFTAIN, July 2004, at 5; Karl Hess, Jr. & Tom Wolf, Treasure of La Sierra,
REASON, Oct. 1999, available at http://reason.com/9910/fe.kh.treasure.html (last visited
June 22, 2005).
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Whatever the contours of the plan, they will have to be negotiated with
the newest owners of the Taylor Ranch, who inherited the case from
Taylor and his successor, ex-Enron executive Lou Pai. 167 Much is at stake
in what happens on the newly accessible mountain tract-for the
community, for the mountain, and for other land grant heirs, whether
battling for access rights to private lands or for title to lands that were
historically held in common.
Lobato offers an important opportunity for those attempting to
vindicate land and water rights with roots in Mexican or Spanish land
grants. These rights have been routinely denied for over a century
because courts have lacked a framework through which to interpret
rights grounded in the history, culture, and laws of our antecedent
sovereigns. It would have been difficult to imagine decades ago that the
Restatement of Servitudes would provide the means for vindicating the
land rights of the community of San Luis. Certainly this case disproves
those who argue that U.S. courts are unable to recognize property rights
arising under antecedent sovereigns and different systems of law.
However ironic, it seems fitting that the American common law would
be the tool to help bridge the gap between these sovereigns and, in so
doing, to help bail out the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.

167. Deborah Frazier, Embattled San Luis Ranch Sold to Texans, ROCKY MTN. NEws, Aug.
10, 1994, available at http://www.rockymountainnews.com/drmn/state/article/0,1299,
DRMN 21 3099910,00.html (last visited June 22, 2005).

